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Docketing to mail notices.

Plaintiff, Bill Hadley, has filed a two-count amended complaint against defendant, GateHouse Media
Freeport Holdings, Inc., alleging that defendant published defamatory statements implying that plaintiff
committed a crime and that defendant had actual knowledge of the statements’ falsity (Count I), or, in the
alternative, defendant was negligent in publishing the statements (Count II). Defendant has filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Federal Rules Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, defendant’s motion is
granted.
I. BACKGROUND1
Plaintiff is a resident of Stephenson County, Illinois. Defendant publishes The Journal-Standard, a
newspaper distributed in Stephenson County, Illinois, and online at JournalStandard.com. On December 28,
2011, defendant published a news article in The Journal-Standard and on its website entitled “Hadley returns to
county politics/Candidate stresses fiscal responsibility.” Subsequent to the online publication, a person using
the name “Fuboy” posted the following allegedly defamatory comment on defendant’s website: “Hadley is a
Sandusky waiting to be exposed. Check out the view he has of Empire from his front door.”
Plaintiff brings a state law defamation per se claim, alleging defendant published statements it knew were
false or, in the alternative, were negligent in publishing, and these statements have lowered plaintiff’s reputation
and caused damage.
II. DISCUSSION
A motion to dismiss may be granted if the complaint fails to “state a claim upon which relief can be
granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
Section 230(c)(1) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), provides
that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any
information provided by another information content provider.” This subsection, while not granting blanket
immunity to interactive computer services, defines who can be called a “publisher” for purposes of civil liability.
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City of Chi., Ill. v. StubHub! Inc., 624 F.3d 363, 366 (7th Cir. 2010); Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights
Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 671 (7th Cir. 2008) (“What § 230(c)(1) says is that an online
information system must not be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by someone else.”
(quotation marks omitted)). Because plaintiff’s complaint rests on defendant being the publisher of the comment
posted by “Fuboy,” the complaint fails to allege enough facts to state a plausible claim.
Defendant, as a website host that allows readers to post comments, is an interactive computer service.
Section 230(f) of the CDA defines an interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including
specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered
by libraries or educational institutions.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(f). This has been interpreted to include websites that
allow users to write comments, because such websites enable multiple users access to the server that hosts the
website. Universal Commc’n Sys, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007); DiMeo v. Max, 248
F. App’x. 280, 282 (3rd Cir. 2007); see also Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 671 (holding that Craigslist, a classified
advertising website, is an interactive computer service), Collins v. Purdue Univ., 703 F. Supp. 2d 862, 878-79
(N.D. Ind. 2010) (holding that a university newspaper’s website is an interactive computer service). Defendant’s
website falls within this category because it allows users to post comments in response to news articles.2
The user that posted the comment is “another information content provider.” Section 230(f) defines an
information content provider as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or
development of information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service.” 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(3). The anonymous user was responsible for the “creation or development of information” posted in
the comment.
Plaintiff argues it is possible that defendant created or developed the information in the comment by
inventing a fictitious person named “Fuboy” in order to post the comment anonymously. However, there are no
such allegations made in the amended complaint. Even if such allegations were made, it would amount to
nothing more than “sheer speculation.” Lycos, 478 F.3d at 425 (“Any suggestion that [defendant] may have done
more specifically to encourage the postings at issue is sheer speculation.”).3
Because defendant is an interactive computer service by providing a website that allows users to post
comments and the user “Fuboy” is another information content provider, defendant cannot be considered the
“publisher or speaker” of the comments posted by “Fuboy.” Claiming that defendant was the publisher of the
alleged defamatory comments would therefore be inconsistent with § 230(c)(1). Section 230(e)(3) prevents
bringing such a claim, stating that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under
any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). Thus, plaintiff’s defamation
claim against defendant is barred by § 230 of the CDA, and plaintiff has failed to allege enough facts to state a
plausible defamation claim against defendant.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and GateHouse Media Freeport
Holdings, Inc. is dismissed with prejudice.
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1. For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations contained in the amended complaint
are accepted as true.
2. The fact that defendant also posts its own newspaper articles does not change the analysis. It is
possible for an entity to be both an interactive computer service and an information content provider.
Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir.
2008). A newspaper is an information content provider for the articles it writes, but is only an
interactive computer service for the comments made by third-party users. Collins, 703 F. Supp. 2d
at 879; see also Craigslist, 519 F.3d at 670 (noting that even if § 230(c)(1) is read as a definitional
clause, “an entity would remain a provider or user . . . as long as the information came from
someone else; but it would become a publisher or speaker . . . if it created the objectionable
information” (quotation marks omitted)).
3. Allowing plaintiff to amend the complaint to include allegations that defendant invented the user
“Fuboy” would not change the outcome of the motion. Such allegations are purely speculative and
would fail to meet the plausibility standard outlined in Twombly. Because “plaintiffs should not be
permitted to conduct fishing expeditions in hopes of discovering claims that they do not know they
have,” McCloskey v. Mueller, 446 F.3d 262, 271 (1st Cir. 2006), plaintiff cannot be granted leave
to amend the complaint.
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